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Abstract
Quality issue: Approximately 10% of patients are harmed by healthcare, and of this harm 15% is
thought to be medication related. Despite this, medication safety data used for improvement pur-
poses are not often routinely collected by healthcare organizations over time.
Initial assessment: A need for a prospective medication safety measurement tool was identiﬁed.
Choice of solution: The aim was to develop a tool to allow measurement and aid improvement of
medication safety over time. The methodology used for the National Health Service (NHS) Safety
Thermometer was identiﬁed as an approach. The resulting tool was named the ‘Medication Safety
Thermometer’.
Implementation: The development of the Medication Safety Thermometer was facilitated by a
multidisciplinary steering group using a Plan, Do, Study, Act (PDSA) method. Alpha and beta test-
ing occurred over a period of 9 months. The tool was ofﬁcially launched in October 2013 and con-
tinued to be improved until May 2016 using ongoing user feedback.
Evaluation: Feedback was gained through paper and online forms, and was discussed at regular
steering group meetings. This resulted in 16 versions of the tool. The tool is now used nationally,
with over 230 000 patients surveyed in over 100 NHS organizations. Data from these organizations
are openly accessible on a dedicated website.
Lessons learned: Measuring harm from medication errors is complex and requires steps to meas-
ure individual errors, triggers of harm and actual harm. PDSA methodology can be effectively
used to develop measurement systems. Measurement at the point of care is beneﬁcial and a
multidisciplinary approach is vital.
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Quality issue
Approximately 1 in 10 patients are harmed by healthcare [1–3]. It is
thought that 15% of these harms are associated with medication-
related incidents [3], which remain the single largest source of repeti-
tive healthcare error [4]. Despite these statistics, there is a lack of
tools to routinely measure medication safety in healthcare organiza-
tions over time.
Initial assessment
Previous research indicates that harm to patients involving medication
is often preventable [5]. Therefore, interventions aimed at reducing
medication errors have the potential to make a substantial difference
to improving patient safety [3]. In order to prevent medication errors
and reduce the risks of harm, organizations must detect and measure
errors [6], and analyse the information collected to understand what is
happening and why. Medication errors are currently under-reported,
often because they are corrected before reaching the patient [7].
Nonetheless, the small proportion of errors that do reach the patient
may potentially cause severe harm, including death [8].
Most medication safety data are obtained through either
research studies or, more commonly, voluntary reporting. The latter
has been the mainstay of learning from medication safety incidents
within the UK’s National Health Service (NHS). However, volun-
tary reporting underestimates error [8–12], and even though the
number of reports has continually increased since the National
Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) was established [13], the
numbers and quality of reports from individual organizations
remain variable [12]. Data collected for research studies are more
reliable than voluntary reports and can be used for learning ‘and’
measuring. However, such data collection methods are rarely used
in practice, as they are time-consuming, labour-intensive and expen-
sive [14, 15]. Hence, they are not sustainable or practical in the long
term for busy healthcare environments.
Previous literature has suggested that it is time to review and update
data collection methods with ‘fresh eyes’ [10]. Therefore, NHS England
commissioned Haelo (an independent innovation and improvement
science centre hosted by Salford Royal Hospital NHS Foundation
Trust) [16] to explore whether the NHS Safety Thermometer approach
could be applied to collect medication safety data, which could be used
for learning and measurement, and to support organizations in decreas-
ing the risk of harm from medication error over time.
Choice of solution
The NHS Safety Thermometer, developed in 2010 as part of a
national safety improvement programme in England, is a tool that
has enabled organizations to collect data on common harms on 1 day
each month and to track improvement over time [17]. The original
NHS Safety Thermometer measures harm from pressure ulcers, falls,
venous thromboembolism and urine infections in catheterized
patients. It also provides a composite measure of ‘harm free’ care,
deﬁned as the absence of the measured harms [18].
Following the national rollout of the Safety Thermometer spe-
cialist groups and frontline teams identiﬁed that this methodology
could be used for additional patient safety issues. Four ‘next gener-
ation’ Safety Thermometers were developed for maternity, mental
health, children and young people and, the subject of this paper, the
Medication Safety Thermometer (MedsST).
A national multidisciplinary steering group was commissioned
by NHS England and facilitated by Haelo. This group initiated the
development of the MedsST, an instrument that aimed to support
local measurement of harm from medication, and related improve-
ment. The MedsST also needed to allow for data to be aggregated
and assessed at regional and national levels, in line with the NHS
Outcomes Framework, which requires a focus on the ‘incidence of
medication errors causing serious harm’ [19].
The steering group adhered to the Safety Thermometer design prin-
ciples, that the tool would: have clinically valid deﬁnitions, be efﬁcient,
be used wherever the patient is treated, provide immediate access to
data over time, measure all harm experienced by the patient regardless
of preventability, measure harm at the patient level enabling a compos-
ite measure of ‘harm free’ care and be easy to aggregate [18, 20].
Approach to implementation
A plan for developing the MedsST was constructed using a driver
diagram framework (Fig. 1). Alpha-testing (from January 2013 to
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Figure 1 Project Plan Framework—adapted from Power et al. [18].
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March 2013) involved very early tests with eight alpha-sites in
Greater Manchester and one alpha-site in London. Beta-testing (‘the
pilot phase’) ran from April 2013 to September 2013. In addition, a
6-month regional Commissioning for Quality and Innovation
(CQUIN) payment target was introduced from April 2013 to March
2014 to incentivize the Greater Manchester organizations to con-
tinue testing the tool. CQUIN targets are used as ﬁnancial levers in
addition to baseline funding for organizations in the NHS [21].
Participation in the beta testing phase was open to all organizations
and led to 43 sites joining the pilot phase. The national rollout of
the MedsST occurred in October 2013 and collection of feedback
for improving the MedsST has continued.
Agreeing on operational deﬁnitions
It was decided to focus on harm due to high-risk medicines and develop
measures of harm related to errors involving these (Tables 1–3).
Technical development
Initially, a paper-based prototype instrument was tested in alpha-
sites; data were entered into a spreadsheet and e-mailed to Haelo.
Monthly feedback was used to design the next iteration of the form.
Guidance for instrument use and data collection
Safety Thermometers have been designed to be used as part of rou-
tine healthcare, in acute and community settings to encourage con-
tinuity of care [22].
The NHS Safety Thermometer data collection is made at the
point of care by a healthcare professional who reviews the patient’s
documentation and performs a physical examination where neces-
sary. For example, the presence of a pressure ulcer, when the skin is
inspected, is classed as a ‘harm’ in the original Safety thermometer.
Early discussions between the steering group and the ﬁrst tests of
change revealed difﬁculties with this methodology when measuring
harm from medicines. In particular, harm from medication may not
be apparent at the time of review. This ‘uncoupling’ of the error
from the harm required a stepped approach to measuring error and
harm. This characteristic is unique to the MedsST and differentiates
it from the original NHS Safety Thermometer.
Guidance documents were developed to support teams in testing
the tool [20]. It was recommended that Step 1 data (process errors)
were collected by nurses, and Step 2 data (triggers of harm) by phar-
macists and nurses together. The third step involved a multidisciplin-
ary ‘huddle’ to discuss if harm had actually occurred. In hospital
settings, this would involve at least the nurse, pharmacist and junior
doctor looking after the patient on the ward, and in the community
this may involve a phone call from a nurse or pharmacist to the GP
overseeing the patient’s care.
Feedback and satisfaction with the instrument
The main methods of feedback to the steering group included:
monthly meetings via a virtual conferencing platform, monthly sur-
veys and regular phone calls and e-mails with volunteers who had
tested the tool. The data collected using the tool, and the feedback
and satisfaction data were discussed regularly within the steering
group. Once changes were agreed, a new version of the tool was cir-
culated. The development team hypothesized that, with increased
satisfaction and ease of use, the number of patients surveyed and the
number of organizations using the tool would increase.
Ethics
Data were collected for NHS service improvement rather than
research; therefore, research ethics committee approval was not
required. No patient identiﬁable data were collected. The data were
collected monthly as part of routine care, therefore causing no bur-
den to patients and the burden on the staff was evaluated using sur-
veys and identiﬁed as minimal.
PDSA testing and instrument reﬁning
Safety Thermometers have been developed using improvement sci-
ence, in particular Plan, Do, Study, Act (PDSA) cycles, which pro-
vide a structure for iterative testing of changes to improve quality
systems. Each measure and deﬁnition included was developed using
numerous cycles.
To date (May 2016), there have been 16 versions of the MedsST
with multiple small changes per version, with each version tested for
2–3 months. Version 16 has now been used for over a year, with no
current plans for Version 17. Version 16 includes subversions for
acute and community settings. The most recent version of the MedsST
is available from www.safetythermometer.nhs.uk [23].
Agreeing on operational deﬁnitions
In order to measure outcomes of harm from medication, proxy mea-
sures were identiﬁed but early tests revealed that this approach alone
would not provide clinically valid deﬁnitions of harm. Attributing harm
to medication error was complex due to several factors. For example,
there may be some time between an error occurring and the harm being
apparent (such as omission of an anticoagulant) or it may be difﬁcult to
establish if the error alone had caused the harm (such as confusion due
to opiate overdose, which could also be due to a competing cause, for
instance, a severe infection). To ensure only a manageable proportion of
the most high-risk patients were triggering Step 2, each operational def-
inition was reﬁned several times (Table 1). In addition, process measures
that may indicate potential harm were also focused on including medica-
tion omissions, allergy status and medicines reconciliation completion.
Technical development
As the number of users increased, an online version using
SurveyMonkey® replaced the spreadsheet method. Once feedback
indicated that the form was suitable, online platforms were devel-
oped, including a dedicated web tool and an application that could
be used on phones or tablets, which also allowed ofﬂine data collec-
tion. This reduced the data collection time and anecdotal feedback
suggests most organizations take <2 minutes per patient (excluding
interruptions and when Step 3 is triggered).
Recommendations for use and observations of use
Through testing, the steering group agreed a recommended sample
for data collection: all patients on ﬁve surgical wards and ﬁve med-
ical wards per hospital, on the same day each month and all patients
(up to 200) in community settings. However, organizations could
choose to scale up their collection sample over time. Suggested dates
for data collection were published in the MedsST guidance [20] and
were used by the majority of organizations.
Feedback from surveys and observations revealed that data have
been collected by a variety of professionals (Tables 1 and 2).
Anecdotal feedback suggested in some, but not all organizations,
Steps 1 and 2 data were regularly analysed at ward and senior
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Table 1 Changes in operational deﬁnitions over time (using Version 1, 8 and 16 for illustration). The most recent version on the MedsST
is available from www.safetythermometer.nhs.uk
Measure/ step Step Version 1 Version 8 Version 16a
Allergy status
documented
1 Was the medicine allergy status
documented in the clinical record in
this care setting (including no
known allergies)?
Was the medicine allergy status
documented in the patient’s clinical
record in this care setting (including
no known drug allergies) e.g. on
prescription or Medication
Administration Review and Request
(MARR) chart?
Same as version 8.
Medicines
reconciliation
initiated
Were all medications documented as
reconciled within 24 hours of
admission to this care setting?
Was medicines reconciliation for all
medicines undertaken (started)
within 24 hours of admission to this
care setting?
Same as version 8.
Omission of
medication
Had the patient had an omitted dose
of any medication in the last 24
hours?
Had the patient had an omitted dose
of any medication in the last 24
hours (excluding food supplements)?
Was the patient on any of the
following medications:
anticoagulants, opioids, insulin or
anti-infectives (excluding food
supplements & oxygen). If so, had
any of these (or ‘any other
prescribed medicines’) been omitted
and for what reason? Reasons:
Patient refused, outstanding
reconciliation, medicine not
available, route not available,
patient absent at medication round,
not documented or other
Omission of high-risk
medication
Not included in Version 1 Were omitted doses (see above) any of
the following: anticoagulant, insulin,
opiate, anti-infective (antibiotics,
antifungals, antivirals and
antimalarials)?
Inclusion criteria and
triggers for harm
from
anticoagulants
2 All anticoagulants were included.
Triggers: If the patient had a bleed,
vitamin K administered or INR
outside the following limits—<2,
higher than 6
Heparin, LMWH, Warfarin and
NOACs (excluding VTE
prophylaxis) were included.
Triggers: A bleed of any kind or
VTE, administration of vitamin K,
protamine or clotting factors e.g.
octaplex, or an INR greater than 6
or APTT ratio greater than 4
Heparin, LMWH, Warfarin and
NOACs (excluding VTE
prophylaxis) were included. Triggers:
A bleed of any kind or VTE, or
administration of vitamin K,
protamine or clotting factors e.g.
octaplex
Inclusion criteria/
trigger for harm
from opiates
All opiates were included. Triggers:
Was the prescribed dose more than
50% higher than the previous dose?
Was the prescribed starting dose
usual for the route to be used? Was
the patient showing any symptoms
of an overdose or common side-
effects?
All opiates included. Triggers:
Common complications (including
sedation, respiratory depression,
confusion), administration of
naloxone, increased early warning
score or respiratory rate below 12
breaths per minute
Opioids excluding oral codeine,
dihydrocodeine and tramadol.
Triggers: Administration of
Naloxone, respiratory rate is <8
breaths per minute
Inclusion criteria/
trigger for harm
from sedatives
All sedatives were included. Triggers:
If the patient had any history of
dementia or delirium, had
administration of Flumazenil or had
had a fall
The following injectable sedatives were
included: midazolam, lorazepam,
diazepam, clonazepam. Triggers:
Common complications of over
sedation (hypotension, delirium,
respiratory depression, reduced
Glasgow Coma Score),
administration of Flumazenil or
increased early warning score
IV or SC sedatives: Midazolam,
Lorazepam, diazepam, clonazepam
were included Triggers: Common
complications (see version 8) or
administration of Flumazenil
Inclusion criteria and
Triggers for harm
from insulin
All insulin included. Triggers: If an
intravenous syringe or a non-insulin
syringe used for insulin preparation
or administration? Was the patient’s
insulin unit dose and frequency
clearly documented? Had the
patient had any omitted doses of
insulin in the last 24 hours?
All insulin was included. Triggers:
Common complications (capillary
blood sugar <4mmol/L, symptoms:
anxiety confusion, extreme hunger,
fatigue, irritability, sweating or
clammy skin, trembling hands),
administration of IV dextrose or
glucagon, or diabetic ketoacidosis or
hyperosmolar hyperglycaemic state
All insulin included. Triggers:
Common complications: capillary
blood sugar <4mmol/L or
symptoms of hypoglycaemia,
administration of IV dextrose or
glucagon or diabetic ketoacidosis or
hyperosmolar hyperglycaemic state
Table continued
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management levels. For example, at some sites, MedsST was ana-
lysed to see which wards were showing most improvement.
Additionally, not all organizations have used Step 3 and, when it
has been used, there have been challenges with completing it at the
point of care. In hospitals, for example, the patient surveyed may
have left the ward by the time the huddle could be arranged. In
those organizations that have used Step 3, it has encouraged volun-
tary incident reporting of harm to allow local investigation and
identiﬁcation, in turn promoting a culture of safety [24].
Feedback and satisfaction with instrument
Virtual conference meetings allowed users and developers to discuss
and suggest improvements based on testing and learning. It was often
highlighted that organizations were experiencing similar problems,
for example, problems with high numbers of referrals from Step 1 to
Step 2, due to codeine-based medication post-surgery (Table 2). There
has been a steep increase in the number of hospitals using the Web
tool and, more recently, the mobile application. Some hospitals have
stopped using the MedsST. Anecdotal feedback suggests some hospi-
tals have stopped using the MedsST due to lack of time and resources.
Setting
The MedsST has predominantly been used in secondary care hospi-
tals; however, has also been used in community settings, including
community hospitals, domiciliary care and nursing homes.
Lessons learned
Repeated PDSA cycles conﬁrmed that attributing harm to medica-
tion error at a single time point is highly complex [4, 9], and it is
necessary to use different steps to observe errors, triggers of harm
and actual harm. The original plan was for the MedsST to involve a
simple bedside point of care audit, similar to the NHS Safety
Thermometer, which focused on harm as an outcome of medication
error. However, the resulting instrument extends this and focuses on
both potential and actual harm due to medication [10].
Adverse events are often multifactorial and it can be challenging
to attribute harm to a medication [9]. By using a number of steps, this
complexity was partially addressed, as only those patients that trig-
gered potential harm indicators were investigated for actual harm.
Previous tools, such as the IHI global trigger tool, have demonstrated
the need for using numerous steps [4]. Although various steps are
required, trigger tools must be as time- and resource-efﬁcient as pos-
sible [25, 26]. A previous study, using the IHI global trigger tool for
Adverse Drug Events (ADEs), reported that 20 minutes was required
to screen a single patient’s record, and the study required a doctor
and pharmacist to spend one-half to one day per site retrospectively
reviewing a random sample of charts that contained triggers [26]. The
study used a 39-item ADE trigger tool and only nine of the 39 triggers
used accounted for 94.4% of ADEs detected [26]. Focusing review on
triggers more predictive of an adverse event, as the MedsST does, is a
better use of resources and may be more likely to improve patient
safety [25, 26].
PDSA methodology can be effectively used to develop
a measurement system
As previous research has suggested, it is occasionally necessary to
simply ‘get on with it’ to assess the outcomes and the methods by
which we can learn and improve a system [27]. However, this
should not be a ‘quick and dirty process’ and requires an efﬁcient
plan, which may be constantly revised [27]. As indicated in Table 1,
some deﬁnitions were expanded and then retracted to the original
deﬁnition over several versions because, until changes are tested, it is
difﬁcult to know their impact.
The overarching aim to develop a tool to allow measurement
and aid improvement of medication safety over time was achieved.
Feedback from organizations using Step 3 suggests the MedsST trig-
gers have been useful to identify actual harm from high-risk medica-
tions, and may have contributed to increased incident reporting and
encouraged multidisciplinary teamwork. However, the focus on
actual harm was expanded to also include potential harm (using
process measures) and some organizations have focused on potential
harm only. Although the focus of the MedsST may differ to what
was originally planned, the PDSA cycle approach is quality driven
and learning from ‘failed’ tests is equally as important as learning
from success, and often the most valuable lessons are learnt from
failure, which enables course correction [28].
Measuring medication error and harm at the point of care is
beneﬁcial and a multidisciplinary approach is vital. The data col-
lected and analysed provide a baseline to establish whether further
improvement work impacts medication safety and if it is main-
tained [12]. The simple act of collecting data should not be underes-
timated and, as data are mainly collected at the point of care by the
multidisciplinary team (MDT), this process alone may help to
improve safety culture and awareness at a local level [29].
Table 1 Continued
Measure/ step Step Version 1 Version 8 Version 16a
3 If any of the above (harms) were
identiﬁed, the team was to refer to
Step 3, which involved a MDT root
cause analysis to determine whether
there was harm from medication
error. The form for Step 3 was to be
conﬁrmed
If triggered, organizations were
recommended to perform an MDT
huddle. This would involve a
discussion with the doctor, nurse
and pharmacist taking care of the
patient to ascertain whether harm
had occurred. The form for Step 3
was to be conﬁrmed
If triggered, organizations were
recommended to perform an MDT
huddle using a supplementary page
for facilitation. The form recorded:
who was involved with the MDT
huddle, their roles and involvement
with the patient’s care. If harm had
occurred, it also recording of the
level of harm based on NPSA harm
scale [8] and learning and outcomes
of Step 3
aVersion 16 consists of two subversions; acute and community. The acute subversion has been used for illustration purposes in this table, as it is used more
predominantly.
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Although more complex than anticipated, it was possible to collect
similar medication safety data in different settings. Testing revealed
that the MedsST needed to be different in community and acute set-
tings, as the resources in each setting are considerably different.
Lessons learned from the data
The focus on medicines reconciliation helps to improve continuity of
care between healthcare settings [22]. Some of the medicines recon-
ciliation rates observed from the national MedsST data are similar
to rates from previous research. For example, national MedsST data
show that ~73% of patients are having medicines reconciliation
within 24 hours (Fig. 2a). This ﬁgure is similar to ﬁndings from a
previous study evaluating medicines reconciliation rates in one UK
hospital (n = 70%) [30]. The aforementioned data, however, indi-
cate that the standard of 95%, previously suggested by the National
Institute for Health and Care Excellence for medicines reconciliation
within 24 hours [30, 31], is not being met. Organizations should be
encouraged to use the MedsST when assessing further improvement
work to increase medicine reconciliation completion rates.
Other MedsST data have varied from data collected in previous
research. For example, MedsST data suggest 22% of patients have
at least one dose omission per day (Fig. 2b) and 5.7% of patients
experience an omission of a critical medication (Fig. 2c). These
omission data are lower than omission rates from previous
research studies, which estimate that 80% of patients have an
omitted dose [32]. This variance is may be due to a number of fac-
tors such as whether studies measure the rate of omissions of doses,
Table 2 Summary of PDSA cycles involved in developing Step 1
Plan Step 1 would focus on error potential and be completed for all patients. It involves collecting demographic data regarding the
patient, their medications, omissions and drug allergy documentation, and identify patients taking any of the four classes of
medicines reported to the UK’s NRLS as most likely to cause death and severe harm between 2005 and 2010 [8] if not
prescribed, dispensed or administered appropriately: anticoagulants, injectable sedatives, insulin and opiates. Step 1 was the ﬁrst
stage of a proxy harm measurement system, and if a patient was on any of the aforementioned medications, Step 2 would be
triggered (Table 3). Prediction: Step 1 would be collected by nurses and they would be comfortable using Step 1, if they were not,
this would be highlighted in user feedback. Step 1 would refer a small proportion of patients who were on high-risk drugs to
allow a manageable ‘snapshot’ of the level of harm from medication errors. Testing would conﬁrm if the high-risk drug class
deﬁnitions were appropriate for this, or whether they were under-sensitive or oversensitive
Do Testing was gradually scaled up as the tool improved, based on feedback from each test. First, very small tests on one patient were
undertaken, then one ward, multiple wards, alpha sites (nine hospitals), beta sites (43 hospitals), and ﬁnally all sites continued to
feedback after the ofﬁcial testing phase ended. Frontline teams collected data and fed back their experience of using the form, for
example, how easy data collection was and how long it took. Feedback was collected at regular intervals and assessed at
biweekly steering group meetings, facilitated by the development team, to ascertain the most efﬁcient method of collecting data.
Feedback platforms included online forums and surveys, verbal reports and meetings. Observations were also undertaken to
better understand the impact of problems, such as the order of questions in regards to ease of data collection
Study The prediction was not entirely correct as some deﬁnitions were not appropriate, for various reasons highlighted below. The main
learning points from testing were:
• In addition to nurses, Step 1 data were also collected by pharmacists, preregistration pharmacists, clinical auditors and
healthcare assistants
• The wording of some questions in Step 1 was not relevant or appropriate for community care settings
• The conceptual order of the questions did not enable the easiest and quickest collection of data, and was not necessarily taking
<10 minutes per patient. The order, although seemingly logical, actually meant that most teams were looking for data in one
place for the ﬁrst question, moving somewhere else on the record to get the data for the next questions, and then going back to
their original source for data for the third question
• A large number of patients who were at a very low risk of harm were triggering Step 2 due to being on opioids. Qualitative
feedback from testers indicated that they felt that patients on low doses or low risk opioids were going through to Step 2
unnecessarily, as there was very little risk of harm occurring and that this was very time-consuming and disengaging. This was
mostly due to low dose codeine, usually compounded with paracetamol as co-codamol. This had often been prescribed as ‘when
required’ and not always necessarily used by the patient
• There was a need identiﬁed for an appropriate denominator to understand the proportion of omissions of high-risk medication.
In early versions, data about the number of patients who had had omissions of high-risk medications was collected, however,
data about the number of patients who were on the high-risk medications initially were not collected. This meant that users were
using the whole population of patients surveyed as a denominator, as opposed to the population of patients on a high-risk
medication, leading to sampling bias
Act Actions taken in response to study of tests included:
• Development of a community subversion, in which the wording was amended to make Step 1 more relevant to practice in
community
• Individual deﬁnitions were revised to make the tool more practical. For example, it was decided to exclude oral codeine,
dihydrocodeine and tramadol, as the problems they were causing in data collection outweighed the beneﬁt of keeping them. The
concept of the MedsST is to give a snapshot of harm and it is not possible to include all medications, even though they all have
the potential to cause harm
• The form was reordered so that questions were grouped together around the likely source of information. Multiple PDSAs were
conducted to redesign all of the questions, thus increasing ease of data collection and reducing the time required
• A new question was introduced about the number of patients on critical medication
Unresolved
issues
Feedback from users has highlighted that the wording remains unsuitable for community settings; further reﬁning is required. Some
organizations are still taking longer than 10 minutes to survey each patient; further investigation is required to explore the
potential reasons for this
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or the rate of patients with omitted doses [33]. Other reasons
include: studies examining different drug classes or whether data
are collected from electronic prescribing and administration sys-
tems, which have the potential to impact omissions and identifying
the rate of omissions [34]. Therefore, standardization of how omis-
sions are measured is required and in the context of the MedsST,
local improvement has been encouraged, rather than comparison
between organizations.
Lessons learned from the data provide many opportunities for
further improvement work, which can be presented in a variety of
ways. The Pareto Chart in Fig. 2d shows that 80% of critical omis-
sions were with only two of the four critical risk medications (anti-
infectives and opioids). Therefore, the most parsimonious approach
of reducing omissions may be to focus improvement efforts on redu-
cing omissions of anti-infectives and opioids in the ﬁrst instance.
Data collected by the MedsST are presented in run charts on the
website [23]. This allows users to study variation in data over time
and understand the impact of changes with minimal mathematical
complexity [35]. The run charts make data accessible and
understandable to a range of different healthcare professionals.
Special cause variation occurred in August 2014 (Fig. 2b and c),
when there was a decrease in the number of omissions coincident
with the introduction of Version 16. This was due to a change in the
way omissions data were collected and the operational deﬁnitions
that were ﬁrst implemented in Version 16 (Table 1). To address this,
further guidance and support was provided to organizations. This
was done by producing additional guidance and providing support
via group WebExes, and one-to-one phone support to certain orga-
nizations. The data stabilized from September 2014 onwards, sug-
gesting that challenges with data collection had been somewhat
resolved.
Over 230 000 patients have been surveyed using the MedsST in
over 100 organizations (June 2016). As the number of patients sur-
veyed using the MedsST has increased, the denominator for each of
the medication safety measures is larger, which has reduced vari-
ation. A decrease in variation occurred in early 2015, as illustrated in
Fig. 2a–c; in January 2015 the number of patient surveyed was 7425
compared to 5271 patients in December 2015. Furthermore, the
Table 3 Brief summary of PDSA cycles involved in developing Step 2
Plan The plan was for Step 2 to be completed for all patients triggered in Step 1 due to receiving one or more of the high-risk
medications. Step 2 was the second stage of a proxy harm measurement system mentioned in Table 2. For example, if a patient
identiﬁed in Step 1 as being on an anticoagulant, and then in Step 2 it was established that they had had a bleed, these two
factors together would be classed as a harm. Similarly to Step 1, PDSA methodology was used to develop the measures so that
data would be simple to collect, the burden of data collection is minimal and measures are easily understood and clinically valid.
Prediction: Step 2 would be collected by nurses and pharmacists together, who would be comfortable with identifying the harms
listed. The deﬁnitions used for the triggers of harm from medication error would be appropriate for identifying potential harms.
Feedback from users would identify if the deﬁnitions used were appropriate or not
Do Data were collected on all patients identiﬁed in Step 1 who were on any of the drugs from the four high-risk classes. These patients
would go through to Step 2 where a nurse and pharmacist would collect data on whether the triggers of harm had occurred.
First, very small tests on one patient were undertaken, then one ward, multiple wards, alpha sites (nine hospitals), beta sites
(43 hospitals), and ﬁnally all sites continued to feedback after the ofﬁcial testing phase ended. Frontline teams collected data and
fed back on their experience of using the form, for example, how easy data collection was and how long it took. Feedback was
collected at regular intervals and assessed at biweekly steering group meetings, facilitated by the development team to ascertain
the most efﬁcient method of collecting data. Feedback platforms included online forums and surveys, verbal reports and
meetings. Observations were also undertaken to explore the feedback and better understand the impact of problems, such as the
order of questions regarding ease of data collection
Study The prediction that teams would be comfortable with identifying harms was not entirely correct, and a need for revisions was
conﬁrmed as each deﬁnition went through multiple PDSA cycles. Qualitative feedback from several PDSAs indicated that the
attempt to deﬁne harm related to medication errors was extremely complex and that the measures were not representative of
actual medication harm. Some of the key individual issues identiﬁed were:
• Instead of Step 2 being collected by a nurse and pharmacist as recommended, it was mainly collected solely by a pharmacist or in
some cases solely by a nurse. In addition, other professionals, such as pharmacy technicians were collecting data for Step 2
• Certain terminology was not understood by all data collectors depending on their professional background. For example, one of
the triggers of harm from injectable sedatives included assessing the patient’s ‘early warning score’. However, feedback indicated
that most of the data for Step 2 was being collected by the pharmacy team who, as opposed to nurses, were not familiar with this
term. In addition, different organizations had different deﬁnitions of ‘early warning scores’ and not all organizations used them
• Attributing a harm to a medication error using a trigger was difﬁcult. It is absolutely vital to have multidisciplinary discussions
to ascertain the likelihood of whether harm has occurred due to a medication error. In many cases, it was not possible to be
certain that a harm was only related to medication. There could be other factors to consider, making it difﬁcult to decide if a
harm could be classed as a medication harm
Act Deﬁnitions of each individual measure were reﬁned and tested through PDSA cycles numerous times, resulting actions included:
• Reﬁnement of Step 2 to exclude certain triggers. For example, the use of an ‘early warning score’ as a trigger of harm was
removed in version 8
• There was strong consensus from the steering group and the testers that, in order to understand if a harm was caused by a
medication, there needed to be a multidisciplinary discussion involving nurses, doctors and pharmacists when collecting data on
medication harms. This lead to ofﬁcial testing of Step 3, in volunteering organizations, after the launch date (October 2014)
when Step 2 was more reﬁned and stable
Unresolved
issues
The argument for continuing to include ‘when required’ opioids. Some harm may be missed, as harm may occur from low dose
opioids. Many organizations have not been using Step 3 and referring harms from Step 2 for MDT discussion. Further
qualitative exploration is required to ﬁnd out why organizations are not using Step 3
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hypothesis, that the number of organizations and patients surveyed
would increase as the satisfaction and ease of use increased, was cor-
rect. This is also suggested by the fact that the majority of Greater
Manchester organizations chose to continue using the MedsST, des-
pite no longer receiving CQUIN payments after April 2014.
However, some organizations have stopped using the MedsST.
Detailed analysis of such cases is warranted for further learning.
Individual organizational data published online [29] demonstrates
that, despite the constraints of using a tool that is relatively new,
some organizations have improved [29]. This suggests that solutions
to common problems may exist in the user community. Certain
MedsST users, who are positive deviants, may have knowledge that
can be generalized and, if the solutions have been generated within
the MedsST user community, they may be more readily adopted in
other organizations [36–38].
Suggestions for future work
Further research is required to explore how the MedsST is used in
practice and to evaluate its utility. A mixed-method approach may
be suitable for this. Investigation of variance in the use of the
MedsST is warranted, for example, to explore the barriers prevent-
ing some organizations from using Step 3. Investigation of variance
of the actual MedsST data is also warranted. Lessons can be learnt
from organizations who have shown improvement in their MedsST
data. The positive deviance approach may be useful to explore how
the MedsST can successfully be used for improvement.
Conclusion
The MedsST provides a reﬁned methodology for measuring medica-
tion safety and its improvement over time. The PDSA approach has
been particularly helpful in developing the tool. The increased
engagement may be due to the reﬁnement of the tool relying on
regular feedback from frontline users; however, further research is
required to ascertain this. The MedsST is inherently practical and
easy to use, and has been used by over 100 healthcare organizations
across the UK. To the best of our knowledge, it is the only tool
measuring medication safety on a monthly basis. Data collection has
led to demonstrable improvement in some organizations, but not all,
indicating the need for further development and evaluation.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 2 Medicines reconciliation and omissions data over 24 months. (a) Proportion of patients with a medicines reconciliation started in the last 24 hours of
admission to setting. (b) Proportion of patients with omissions of critical medicine(s) in the last 24 hours (The last 24 hours from the point of data collection).
(c) Proportion of patients who have had an omitted dose in the last 24 hours (Anti-infectives include: antibiotics, antifungals, antivirals and antimalarials).
(d) Number of critical omissions by medication class (between October 2013 and April 2016). The line denotes the cumulative frequency of omissions.
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